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NOTES AND COMMENT
in truth liberality in construction and appreciation of the fact that
where a charitable intent manifests itself in a will, however vague,
if possible to do so, the intent should be given effect.
JOSEPH D. REZNICK.
SCHACKNO ACT AND REORGANIZATION.
As Samson sent the walls of the temple crashing about the.heads
of the Philistines, so has President Roosevelt sent reputedly sacred
and inviolable legal precepts crashing about the heads of the
"precedent" lawyers. By applying, to the fullest extent, the weight
of popular support to the powerful lever of public opinion, the Presi-
dent has sufficiently disturbed "solid" foundations of the law so as
to afford an opportunity for legal reform such as has never before
been presented since the formation of the country. "Emergency"
legislation passed in former times was admittedly but temporary;
that which is being passed under the guidance of the present admin-
istration has for its end the permanent reformation of an apparently
imperfect governmental philosophy. It may designate itself as
"temporary" legislation, but, as an integral part of the New Deal, it
must, of necessity, have for its ultimate purpose an effect as perma-
nent and lasting as has the New Deal itself. Never has the adage
that "a chain is as strong as its weakest link" been more forcibly
illustrated.
As a part of this reform program, the Schackno Act ' has been
enacted in New York. Its validity was challenged and it was held,
by Judge Frankenthaler, to be unconstitutional.2 Such decision was
reached in spite of the fact that the same statute had previously been
declared constitutional by Judge Morschauser in Schmaling v. Bur-
ling,3 and by Judge Hinkley in Matter of Title & Mortgage Guar-
antee Company of Buffalo.4 The latter case, as well as the instant
1 L. 1933, c. 745.
'In the Matter of the Application of Abrams for an Order Restraining
Van Schaick, Rehabilitator, from making payments under c. 745, L. 1933.
Such legislation may be validly enacted by Congress for the prohibition
against the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of contracts is directed
only against the states. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718 (1878).
See Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 535, 536, 3 Sup.
Ct. 363 (1883), wherein the court, having reference to legislation similar in
substance to that herein involved, said: "The confirmation and legalization of
'a scheme of arrangement' under such circumstances is no more than is done
in bankruptcy. * * * In no just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a
person of his property without due process of law. They simply require each
individual to so conduct himself for the general good as not to unnecessarily
injure another."
'269 N. Y. Supp. 747 (1933).
'149 Misc. 643, 269 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1933).
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case, was appealed directly to the Court of Appeals as permitted by
the Civil Practice Act,5 and it was reached for decision first.6 The
Court, on appeal, affirmed the Buffalo case, thus declaring the Act
constitutional.
In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the court relied
mainly upon the recent decisions of Home Building and Loan Asso-
ciation v. Blaisdell 7 and People v. Nebbia.8  Quoting from the for-
mer, the court said:
"Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order
to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the main-
tenance of a government by virtue of which contractual re-
lations are worth while-a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. * * *
"This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohi-
bition with the necessary residuum of state power, has had
progressive recognition in the decisions of this court. The
economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of
its continuing protective power, notwithstanding interference
with contracts.
"The question is not whether the legislative action affects
contracts incidentally, or directly, or indirectly, but whether the
legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."
And even more recently, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Nebbia v. People,9 repeated the thought:
"But neither property rights, nor contract rights, are ab-
solute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exer-
cise his freedom of contract to do them harm. Equally funda-
N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT (1933) §588, subd. 3.
N. Y. L. J., April 3, 1934.
'78 L. ed. 255 (1934).
8262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
'N. Y. L. J., March 14, 1934.
For the effect of the declaration of an emergency, see Block v. Hirsch,
256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1920); Brown v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170,
41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1920); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 230 N. Y. 634,
130 N. E. 923 (1921), aff'd, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 229 (1921) ; People v.
LaFetra, 230 N. Y 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921).
As indicative of the trend of the courts, see Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911) ; Hough, Due Process of Law-Today (1919)
32 HARV. L. IREv. 218, 233.
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mental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest."
It is not the intention of the writer to dwell upon the question
of what constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the state,
whether such exercise is the result of an emergency or not. The same
result, i. e., that the enactment is constitutional, may be reached
through analogy to the procedure followed by courts of equity with
regard to corporate reorganizations. 10 The vagueness of the limits
within which the police power may be validly exercised makes it ad-
visable to sustain the Act upon some other grounds.
The principal objective of the Act is the simplification of the
problem of reorganization for the holders of guaranteed mortgage
participation certificates. That the subject is one of widespread im-
portance is evidenced by the fact that in New York State alone an
amount in excess of $1,000,000,000. worth of such certificates have
been issued." Its importance is further evidenced by the considera-
tion that investment therein has not been restricted to a small capi-
talistic group; on the contrary, investment therein is widespread,
persons of moderate means holding the great majority of the cer-
tificates. 12 When we further realize that the certificates are a legal
means of investment for trustees,13 we are constrained to increase
the scope of their importance. The necessity for protection of these
holders, as well as of the guaranty companies, is apparent from the
acknowledgedly torpid condition of the real estate market. That
by such designation we are more than flattering the actual situation
is epitomized by the farce that was the Hotel Pierre foreclosure
"sale." There, the property, evaluated at $10,000,000., was "sold"
for $200,000. and the only bidder was the reorganization committee.14
This condition has caused a corresponding loss of income from
the property. There need be no citation of authority to bear out
the statement that rental values have decreased as sharply as vacan-
cies have increased. The owners have been forced to default in
payment of taxes, of interest, of principal; the guarantors' reserves
Matter of Title Guarantee & Trust Co. of Buffalo, supra note 6: "So,
too, analogy may be found in decrees of courts of equity providing for cor-
porate reorganizations."
" L. 1933, c. 745, §1 ; Letter, dated February 21, 1934, to Governor Lehman
from George W. Alger, Moreland Commissioner.
Appellant, in his brief (p. 18), places the estimate at $3,000,000,000, thereby
including guaranteed mortgages with the guaranteed mortgage participation
certificates.
" The average investment is $3,000. Appellant's Brief, p. 18.
'N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1933) §21.
" These, as well as all subsequent figures, are, unless otherwise indicated,
taken from Appellant's Brief.
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have been dangerously sapped; the security holders have been forced
to foreclose.15
But foreclosure in itself brings nothing. There are no bidders
and the mortgagee is forced to take the property. This necessitates
a reorganization.
At best, reorganization is vexatious, and at all times it is costly.
Yet it seems to be the only solution under our existent law.
"Each certificate holder has the rights of a tenant in com-
mon * * *." 16 That common interest of the participation certificate
holders, both in the mortgage and in the security, effectively pre-
vents a change in the lien by any direct means unless the consent
of every holder of a certificate-no matter how minute that inter-
est might be-is obtained.1 7  " * * * and so where there is a de-
fault, the only recourse in the absence of such consent is to fore-
close." 18 It is to remedy just such condition that the Schackno Act
has been passed. Its most important provision permits certificate
holders, in principal amount of 333%,19 to promulgate a'plan of
reorganization and, provided that two-thirds in principal amount 
20
consent to the plan, which must have the approval of the court, it will
be binding upon the remaining one-third.21 Therefore, bearing in
mind this principal objective of the Act and the speedy means offered
by which an effective control of the property may be had, let us
' Indicative of such is the following chart, taken bodily from Appellant's
Brief. It concerns only those mortgages contained in Group Series F-i:
Arrear'
No. of
Classification Mtges. Principal Interest Taxes Amortization
Owner in Possession
No Arrears 4 $ 713,250.00 0 0 $ 6,000.00
Owner in Possession
Arrears 39t 8,419,331.67 $ 142,110.27 $ 212,916.60 303,630.00
Assignments of Rents 34 9,767,050.00 726,757.25 665,173.76 471,000.00
Under Foreclosure 4 600,200.00 33,674.33 26,908.75 23,700.00
Foreclosed 40 8,390,875.00 275,249.15 165,808.40 164,750.00
Total 121 $27,890,706.67 $1,177,791.00 $1,070,807.51* $969,080.00
* Does not include second half 1933 taxes.
t Includes assignments of rents held in escrow.
"0Instant case; Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganizations (1919)
32 HARV. L. REV. 489; FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. (Perm. Ed.) §7271; see Brooks
v. Vermont Central R. Co., 22 Fed. 211 (C. C. Vt. 1884).
' FLETCHER, 10c. cit. supra note 16.
" Ibid.
" I. e., exclusive of those certificates held by the guarantor, L. 1933, c.
745, §3.
'Ibid.
2 L. 1933, c. 745, §6.
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examine the means which would, in the statute's absence, have to be
resorted to in order to obtain such control. 22
It has been before shown that the certificate holders cannot, by
direct means, effectuate any change in lien unless there be a unanim-
ity of consent to such modification. 23 But, the mere existence of
such hindrance does not dispense with the necessity of the reorgani-
zation. Therefore, to achieve such end, it is necessary to proceed
in a roundabout manner, namely, by foreclosure. 24  That this ap-
parent contradiction in terms 25 is, in truth, not such, is revealed
by the actuality that "the foreclosure sale on reorganization is more
or less a formal matter; a device rather than a fact. It serves the
purely formal purpose of removing the lien. * * *" 26
Nor is the recognition of the artificiality of the foreclosure sale
wherein there is involved a reorganization confined to the mere state-
ment of a text-book writer.2 7  On the contrary it has proceeded far,
both in this country and in England. In the latter country, there
has been passed a statute which governs reorganizations 28 and dis-
penses with the technicality of sale. Likewise in this country, Ken-
tucky 29 has passed a somewhat similar law. So far has this recog-
nition progressed that, even without the aid of statute, the formality
was dispensed with in the famous Phipps case.30 Simply stated,
' It is the general practice that an exclusive agency be conferred upon the
guarantor for the purpose of allowing it to bring any action that may. be
necessary. Matter of Nemerov, 149 Misc. 797, 268 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1934).
Nevertheless, the assumption is here made that no such contract rights' exist,
for their existence only complicates the procedural aspect. Kline v. 275 Madi-
son Avenue Corp., 149 Misc. 747, 751, 752, 268 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1934), where
the court indicates that the participation certificate holder who has so con-
tracted has open to him but two courses: (1) To proceed under the Schackno
Act, or, (2) To petition "* * * to obtain a judicial decree revoking the exclu-
sive agency previously conferred upon the guarantor and permitting the insti-
tution of foreclosure proceedings * * *' whereupon "* * * the court may, if
convinced that the opposition is interposed unjustifiably and in bad faith, and
perhaps for other reasons, grant the decree applied for."
See also WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FoRECLOsuRE (4th ed. 1927) §322.
'Supra note 18; see Matter of Nemerov, supra note 22, at 803.
4WiLTsiE, op. cit. supra note 22, §321.
"For reorganization connotes "* * * the act or process of organizing
anew." FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 16, §7201.
' FLETcHER, loc. cit. supra note 16; Weiner, Conflicting Functions of Upset
Prices in Corporate Reorganizations (1927) 27 COL L. REv. 132, 137.
1 Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., infra note 30, at 952: "It is true
that there was a judicial sale in that case (Kansas City, Southern Ry. v.
Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 166, 36 Sup. Ct. 334 [1916]) and that in the
case in hand there has been no judicial sale; but it was not the judicial sale
that made the decree and the title of the reorganized company impervious to
the attacks of the creditors of the old company."
'RAILWAY COMPANIES AcT, 1867, 30 and 31 Vict. c. 127.
For an analysis of the Canadian system of "reconstruction," see Fraser,
Reorganization of Companies in Canada (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 932.
'See FLETCHER, lOc. cit. supra note 16.
"'Phipps v. Chicago, R I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922), certiorari granted 261 U. S. 611, 43 Sup. Ct. 363 (1923), dismissed per
stipulation, 262 U. S. 762, 43 Sup. Ct. 701 (1923). The case seemingly repre-
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that case made it compulsory upon the dissenting minority security
holders, by enjoining them from other action on their part, to join
in the plan of reorganization promulgated by the majority and ap-
proved as to fairness by the court. The only departure from the
customary routine was the lack of foreclosure sale; in other features,
the case is but ordinary. Yet despite the fact that such omission
is its only distinguishing feature, the method followed has been fre-
quently doubted as to soundness from the legal standpoint.31 While
it is perfectly true that the method has not been followed in subse-
quent decisions, it is equally true that it has not been overruled. The
method, were it once approved as to form, would undoubtedly be the
preferable one since it does away with many of the technicalities
and consequent delays. Reason may be found for the lack of subse-
quent decisions of approval in the fact that corporation lawyers do
not wish to take upon themselves the responsibility of advising clients
as to their safety in taking new securities under such procedure when
they can be certain of safety through reliance upon time tested and
approved precedent.
Although there be no sound reason for not following the Phipps
case, it is undeniably the fact that such procedure is not usual. The
general practice of the courts is to adhere to the farce of foreclosure
sale. It is necessary, therefore, to consider in what respects, if any,
such procedure differs in result from that attained by the Schackno
Act.
It has ever been the problem to get a fair price for the property
foreclosed. The earliest practice was to reopen the bid upon an ad-
vance of 10% in the price bid.32  This procedure was obviously
faulty in that it resulted in uncertainty both to the bidder and to
the seller as to whether or not there was a consummated sale. It
was finally suggested that a minimum sale price be set below which
no sale would be confirmed. 33 The suggestion was adopted and has
been followed in substance ever since.
sents a mean between the established procedure and that authorized by the
Schackno Act for, by the usual procedure, except for the sale, "* * * it not
only imposed on the minority creditors a plan approved by the court, but
restored the property to the defendant-corporation and required non-assenting
creditors to take stock for their claims, enjoining other action 'on their part."
Rosenberg, Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co. (1924) 24 COL.
L. REv. 266, 267.
See Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln Horse & Mule Commission,
284 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
For other similar cases, see American Brake Shoe & F. Co. v. Pittsburgh
Ry., 296 Fed. 204 (W. D. Pa. 1918); Gates v. Boston & N. Y. Air Line R. R.,
53 Conn. 333, 5 Atl. 695 (1885) (the statute making the will of the majority
compulsory upon the minority existed before the making of the mortgage in
controversy).
' SWAINE, SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZA-
TION AND REGULATION (1931) 133, 167 et seq.
' Weiner, supra note 26, at 133; TRAcY, CORPORATE FORECLOSURES
(1929) §240.
Jervoise v. Clarke, 1 Jac. & W. 388 (1820).
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But, the practice of setting an upset price has seemingly found
favor only in the Federal Courts.34 Since its first use in the Blair
case 35 it has developed until it is now the usual practice to set a
price below which no sale will be confirmed.36
There is no conflict of opinion as to the purpose of the upset
price.37 Its birth was the result of the endeavor to secure a fair
price for the property sold. As it developed to its present form,
there has always existed the acknowledgment that its purpose is the
insuring of a fair price to dissenters for their holdings. 3
Generally, the three types of persons interested in the securing
of a high upset price are: (1) Dissenting bondholders; (2) unse-
cured creditors; (3) the guarantor, if any, of the bonds. 39  It goes
almost without saying that the reorganization committee is interested
in the fixing of as low a price as the court can be induced to set.
There being conflicting interests, upon what theory may the
court fix the price? We have already seen that it is virtuously pro-
tested that the object of the upset price is the protection of the dis-
senter. However, even Professor Weiner, as well as the courts,
which at various times have used all four methods, ignores that
purpose when stating the theories upon which the estimate may be
based. These theories are:
Method A: A merely nominal amount over and above
the expenses of reorganization and prior claims.
Method B: An amount based upon the scrap value of
the property.
Method C: An amount which would assure to the non-
participators the equivalent in cash of that which the reor-
ganizers receive in securities.
Method D: The highest figure which, in the opinion
of the court, would allow success to grace the new venture.40
'Weiner, supra note 26, at 137.
In the West, the prevalent practice is to regulate sale prices by means of
legislation. 35 C. J. 17.
'Blair v. St. Louis, H. & K. Ry., 25 Fed. 232 (C. C. Mo. 1885).
'FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 16, §§7242, 7272.
See St. Louis-San Fran. Ry. Co. v. McElvain, 253 Fed. 123 (E. D. Mo.
1918).
The setting of the upset price is not compulsory, being rather within the
discretion of the court. Palmer v. Bankers Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747, 754
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
'Weiner, supra note 26, at 138.
' Investment Registry, Ltd. v. Chicago & M. E. Ry., 212 Fed. 594, 609
(C. C. A. 7th, 1913); In re Prudential Outfitting Co., 250 Fed. 504, 507
(S. D. N. Y. 1918).
For insight into the history and development, see SWAINE, supra note 31,
at 143 et seq.
= TRAcy, op. cit. supra note 32, §207.
Weiner, supra note 26, at 139, 140.
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Now, taking all four methods into consideration (and, so far
as appears, no other methods have been suggested) where is the pro-
tection to the dissenting minority? It is, of course, non-existent.
Were Method C to be adopted, there would be no reorganization; it
would be to the benefit of the bondholder to dissent for he would then
receive cash equivalent in amount to the securities received by the
depositor under the reorganization plan and be free from the pos-
sibility of further loss, whereas the reorganizer would be forced to
expend more money and, in return for his double investment, receive
securities which guarantee to him only the possibility of further
loss. Method B would obviously be of no more protection than
Method A. In either case, the bondholder would have to join to
even possess the hope of salvaging anything from the wreckage which
would be commensurate with the actual value of his holdings.And Method D affords no greater protection.4 1 It is but logical
for the reorganization committee to be interested in making the pur-
chase at the lowest possible figure. It "has an idea of how much
money can be raised by the plan, and inferentially how much can
be spared for dissenting bondholders." 42 Therefore, to again quote
Professor Weiner:
"* * * the court is not entirely a free agent in fixing upset
prices, * * *. From the very fact that no one other than
the reorganization committee will bid 43 the court must eventu-
ally fix a price which the committee will pay. Fixing the
upset price may therefore resolve itself into a form of bar-
gain between the court and the committee." 44
And as to the bargain, it requires no discerning mind to see
who has the better of it. True, the court may set its price, which
may be just. But if it be not agreeable to the reorganization com-
mittee, there will be no buyer and what then is there left the court
to do other than to, with as much dignity as it can muster, lower
the sale price? 45 Consequently, with the setting of the figure, the
'Moreover, the propriety of the adoption of either Method C or Method
D is questioned. FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 16, §7272; Spring, supra note
16; SWAINE, sapra note 31, at 167 (that concern which is the subject of sale is
a "broken down machine," naturally selling at a substantially lower price
than a going concern).
'
2 Weiner, supra note 26, at 142.
'FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 16, §§7272, 7273.
" Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorgan-
izations (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 899, 911.
'BYRNE, SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION
AND REGULATION (1930) 77, 135: "Moreover, fixing an upset price and getting
it are two different things. If no one bid the amount fixed the court would
have to reduce it."
See TRACY, 10c. cit. supra note 32: "In other words, the reorganization
committee will have only a certain amount of money available to pay non-
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ranks of the reorganizing bondholders swell to a considerable ex-
tent.46  The courts, fully recognizing such fact, usually make it a
condition to confirmation of the sale that the dissenters be allowed
to join.47
The result is, therefore, that the dissenter must join in the plan
if he wishes to adequately protect his interest. While there can
be no doubting of the dissenter's right to his pro rata share of the
proceeds in cash,4 8 it is seldom that such does happen, unless it be
through inadvertence and mistake on the part of the security holder.
Under the Schackno Act, such unfortunate occurrence cannot take
place.
While the protection of the dissenting minority bondholder has
been emphasized and is an important consideration, it is also true
that the protection of the majority must be recognized as an im-
portant function of the Act. "Hold-up" minorities ofttimes instigate
litigation for the sole purpose of delaying the reorganization, hoping
thereby to force the majority to buy them out in order that they, the
majority, might pursue a plan of reorganization which would ulti-
mately result in profit.49 The chances in such case of a forced set-
tlement are extremely favorable, the more especially when the situ-
ation is such as at the present time exists with regard to the partici-
pation certificate holders. In such cases as these, reorganization is
imperative and unless rushed through in the shortest possible time,
the deterioration to the buildings on the property, as well as the
other receivership expenses, is likely to be great enough to practically
prohibit the success of any reorganization.
Moreover, it is by no means uncommon for a minority to exist
hoping solely that some technical misstep be made by the proponents
of the reorganization. If luck be with the minority wherein such
is the situation, an inadvertent omission can result in a defeat of
participating bondholders, and if the upset price is fixed at too high a figure,
the plan will fail and the committee will not bid."
," Weiner, supra note 26, at 143: "No general statistics are available as to
the results of these upset prices in practice, but even a casual study of the
proportion of bondholders depositing under a plan reveals that after the upset
price has been fixed * * * the minority dwindles into insignificance."
'. Southern Pac. Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1919);
Shaw v. Little Rock & Ft. Smith Co., 100 U. S. 605, 609, 610 (1879) ; Palmer
v. Bankers Trust Co., supra note 36.
FLETCHER, 10c. cit. supra note 16; Weiner, supra note 26, at 137.
,SWAINE, supra note 31, at 163, 164: "Receiverships are always expensive
luxuries, and once a plan of reorganization has been agreed upon by a majority
of the security bondholders, its prompt consummation is imperatively desirable,
in order to obtain, at the earliest possible moment, the cessation of the
drain * * *, the savings presumably provided by the plan and the elimination
of uncertainty in the personnel of the organization. Minority factions usually
avail themselves of this value to the majority * * * to seek delay and, by their
opposition, to create for their bonds * * * a maneuvering value which will
secure them better terms than are given others of their class, or gain advan-
tages for their class at the expense of other * * * participants."; TRACY, op.
cit. supra note 32, §281.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the plan. And the majority, in order to prevent such financial
calamity as may be the result, may be forced to buy out the dissenters
upon the basis of 100 cents on a dollar."0
Flowing correlatively from the above outlined system is a
situation, the importance of which to this question cannot be over-
emphasized. Undoubtedly, the statute does not have as its main
object the protection of the guaranty companies, yet that element
is specifically mentioned 51 and so cannot be disregarded in its en-
tirety. Indeed, even though it were not so mentioned, it could well
be said that such object would necessarily be read into the enact-
ment due to the fact that the business of the guarantors is so sub-
stantially tinged with public interest.5 2 Thus, the consideration of
the protection of the funds of the guaranty companies must enter
into the discussion. Exclusive of the statute, protection is lacking.
Making the most favorable concession for the continuance of
the common law method, namely, that Method C is used in the
determination of the upset price, still, in these parlous times at
least, this figure would be far below the principal amount of the
issue. From the very nature of things, it must be below such prin-
cipal amount, for the motivating force behind foreclosure is the de-
preciated value of the property against which the certificates were
issued. Such being the case, the situation which caused the litiga-
tion in Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Western Pacific Ry.,53 would
be recurring with alarming frequency. The facts there were, X Cor-
poration had floated an issue of bonds in the principal amount of
$38,000,000., which issue was guaranteed as to payment by the de-
fendant. Unfortunately for all concerned, the X Corporation ran
into financial difficulties and was forced to undergo reorganization.
The bondholders began foreclosure proceedings and, after much
litigation, an upset price of $18,000,000. was fixed and it was for
such amount that the sale was consummated. Thereafter, this ac-
tion was instituted on behalf of the bondholders to recover the dif-
ference between the guaranteed principal amount and the upset, or
its equivalent, the sale price. Recovery was allowed, the Circuit
Court saying (p. 339) :
" * * * the principal debt was the limit of liability, and
that was diminished by what plaintiff's bondholders got in
foreclosure."
o Appellant's Brief at 36, 37.
' L. 1933, c. 745, §1.
' N. Y. INSURANCE LAW (1933) §170 et seq.
53 Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Western Pac. Ry., 244 Fed. 485
(S. D. N. Y. 1917), aff'd sub. nor., Equitable Trust Co. v. Denver & R. G.
R. Co., 250 Fed. 327 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), certiorari denied, 246 U. S. 672, 38
Sup. Ct. 423 (1918).
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And, the District Court (pp. 504, 505) :
"The sale establishes the value, and any upset price what-
ever is a concession to the known. uselessness of an auction
in such cases. If the upset price be too low, any creditor must
protect himself by bidding.* * * That judicial sales are of
small value to creditors, I cannot help; it results from apply-
ing the same procedure to the sale of a quarter section and
of a system of national transportation."
There is no good reason, except a moral one, why such rule
should not be applicable to cases arising hereunder. Attention, how-
ever, is called to the recently enacted laws governing foreclosure ac-
tions. 54 These provide, in substance, that no action to foreclose a
mortgage shall be maintainable wherein it appears that the sole
default relied upon is in the payment of principal, or of any install-
ment thereof; 5 that, correspondingly, no action shall be maintain-
able upon any guarantee of payment of a mortgage unless an action
to foreclose such mortgage would be permissible; 56 nor is the holder
of a guaranteed mortgage participation certificate allowed to sue on
the instrument as long as the rate of interest prescribed therein is
paid . 7 However, it is also provided that the statute of limitations
shall not run with regard to any action which would have accrued
to any of the above were it not for the legislation enacted; 58 nor
is the guarantor discharged by virtue of any of these provisions.59
It is further provided that in any action against the guarantor of
the mortgage to recover any of the indebtedness so secured the
judgment therein shall be limited to "the fair and reasonable value
of the mortgaged property less the amounts owing on prior liens
and encumbrances." 60
Assuming then that the courts will rule that the actual price, or
that which in the court's estimation is the actual price, shall be the
basis for the computation of any deficiency, still, it is submitted that
such figure could not, based upon existing values, even approximate
the face amount of the issue. That such result would be ruinous
to the guaranty companies, many of which are already in the hands
of the Rehabilitator, is apparent.
"L. 1933, c. 793; N. Y. CiviL. PRAcTIcE Act §§1077a-1077g; L. 1933, c.
794; N. Y. CIVIL PRAcrIcE AcT §§1083a, 1083b.
IN. Y. CIVIL PRAcTIcE AcT (1933) §1077a: "* * * a default *** other
than the non-payment of principal or an installment of principal *** shall not




I Supra note 56.
New York Civil Practice Act (1933) §1077g exempts savings and loan
institutions from the workings of the Act.
N. Y. CIVIL PRAcncE AcT (1933) §1083b.
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In effect then, what this procedure amounts to, is the setting
of an upset price after the sale rather than before it, the purpose
contemplated being the arbitrary assessment of deficiencies. It smells
muchly as though the well-known practice of locking the stable after
the horse has been stolen is being indulged in.
Moreover, the duration of the statutes is limited, by expressed
terminology, to July 1, 1934,61 although it does seem probable that
their life will be prolonged by legislative act. In any event, how-
ever, it is seen that such statutes will but result in a short-lived
delay of the natural consequences of the situation. It would be but
a matter of time before another "Hotel Pierre" situation arose.
Therefore, it would seem that a refusal by the court to set an upset
price would not better the situation, but rather would render it the
more precarious.6 2 The ultimate result would be that the Reorgani-
zation Committee, usually the only bidder, would be able to compel
the assent of the dissenters by offering a grossly inadequate price
on the sale.63 For these reasons, the statute should be held con-
stitutional.
An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is being
taken on the Schackno Act, but the writer believes that the decision
-id. §§1077g. 1083b.
"In the above-mentioned "Hotel Pierre" case, the mortgage on the prop-
erty was $6,500,000. Deducting therefrom the $200,000 realized upon "sale,"
the obvious deficiency is $6,300,000. Equally obviously, no such deficiency could
result were there an upset price fixed. Even assuming that the court, on the
motion to assess the deficiency, were to set a price that would be the equivalent
to the upset price, still such procedure would not be the preferable one, for
while the latter would be the minimum price that could be realized for the
property, the former would be the maximum.
Spring, supra note 16, at 494, 503.
The truth of the statement is, moreover, exemplified by the actual practice.
The following chart, with the figures thereon being taken from the files of the




Property Amount of for Each
Mortgages Dollar Invested
Pierre Hotel ................................ $6,500,000.00 .0207
Central Zone Building ............ 2,006,000.00 .1047
875 West End Avenue .............. 1,119,500.00 .098
1133 Park Avenue .................... 675,000.00 .357
910 Fifth Avenue ...................... 1,100,000.00 .048
522 West End Avenue ............. - 478,500.00 .1453
Yorkshire Gardens .................... 750,000.00 .154
Erco H all ..................................... 381,500.00 .3619
Cerana ......................................... 994,000.00 .0974
827 West End Avenue ............. 1,119,500.00 .1699
Squibb Building .......................... 4,500,000.00 .0000
Note: Some of the percentages allocable to dissenting bondholders are
subject to a further reduction for tax arrears.
NOTES AND COMMENT
will not be disturbed. To summarize: It is not quite in harmony
with the spirit of the times to declare unconstitutional a statute, the
principal fault of which is found in its outspokenness. We are
gradually getting away from the antiquated formalities and fictions
of the law. Today, if ever, we are in need of speedy legal processes.
Foreclosure and reorganization, such as would be necessary as an
alternative, is not inducive to rapid results. The Schackno Act dis-
penses with much of the hindering red tape. It has the further ad-
vantage of being economical, thusly resulting directly to the pe-
cuniary advantage of the certificate holder. In that respect espe-
cially, it differs from the ordinary reorganization.
6 4
Moreover, as has been shown, the latter method with all
of its acknowledged legality accomplishes no more in the end than
does the Schackno Act. The dissenters in a common law reor-
ganization are compelled to join forces with the majority 65 if they
are to obtain a remuneration which will compensate them for the
value of the securities which they hold; the dissenters, by virtue of
the mechanics of the Schackno Act, are compelled to assent to the
plan due to the mandatory nature of the statute.
The enactment is not an example of the "all too ready resort
of America to legislation." 66 The words of Mr. Rosenberg: "Let
us leave the growth of our jurisprudence regarding this still develop-
ing subject of reorganization to the courts and the bar * * *," 67
express the exact sentiment which we must avoid. The judicial
growth of the law governing reorganizations has not, in spite of
the Phipps case,68 been toward the simplification of the problem.
What is needed to relieve the present plight of both securities holders
and guaranty companies is a procedure which will make possible
a speedy and economical reorganization of the security without
any disturbance of the guarantee. The Schackno Act satisfies such
need.6 9
WILLIAM E. SEWARD.
A NEW IMPLIED COVENANT.
The recent case of Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co.,' di-
rects our attention to the construction and interpretation of con-
' Referee's opinion, Chase National Bank v. 10 East 40th Street Corp.,
N. Y. L. J., Oct. 2, 1933, shows reorganization expenses in the amount of
$346,640.38. Appellant's brief (p. 48) estimates the average cost of reorgan-
ization under the Schackno Act to be $3,000.
'Weiner, supra note 26, at 145: "The upset price *** has become one of
the most useful tools of the majority for forcing recalcitrants into line."
c Rosenberg, mtpra note 30, at 271.
Id. at 272.
'Supra note 30.
' Schmaling v. Burling, vtpra note 4: "* * * the provisions of the
Schackno Act are necessary in the exercise of the police power of the state to
safeguard and protect the interests of the many against the few."
1263 N. Y. 79, 188 N. E. 163 (1933).
